This smoothly written and sophisticated study of intelligence analysis will appeal to a broad audience... [The authors'] social science approach, lack of ideological bias, and ability to dissect organizational behavior produce a masterful account... Recommended.Read more
Jones and Silberzahn have crafted an insightful masterpiece to frame the true nature of the CIA... I recommend this book to anyone with a passion in understanding the analytical framework of the CIA and who seeks to comprehend the theoretical approach, through the uses of organizational theory, in uncovering its internal mysteries.
Winter 2013-14 issue of Parameters, official journal of the US Army War CollegeRead more
The authors should be complimented for providing a fresh look at the functioning of the CIA as they analyze the commonalities underlying its numerous intelligence failures. The book touches upon some of the most profound issues that have divided the Directorate of Intelligence as it struggles to understand the often complex and confusing international realities with a special emphasis on the analytical tradition of Sherman Kent, the intellectually architect of the DI. It is a welcome addition to the literature on intelligence failures and a timely remainder of the difficulties that American intelligence faces in coping with the Arab Spring.
Ofira Seliktar, Professor of Political Science, Gratz College
Lien : It's hard to overstate how useful this book is in explaining why the enormous resources the United States has put into intelligence gathering and analysis have so often yielded so little - and actually yielded the reverse of what was necessary, worse yet, in specific cases where available "Cassandra" sources could have guided American analysts (and were trying to) in directions that might well have saved us four costly "strategic surprises."The case of a Russian Cassandra, the late Soviet émigré economist Igor Birman, offers an example of institutional analytical failure that was both unfortunate for American interests and saddening for people who knew the principal: Birman was a difficult man telling inconvenient truths about the state of the Soviet economy and the society around it; "Constructing Cassandra" does an excellent job of dispassionately demonstrating why the real intelligence and reasoned projections he had to offer were downplayed and/or dismissed - a mistake for which we paid in 1991 and, in very real ways, continue to pay today. See it here on Amazon.
Lien : [From Amazon.com] Much has been written about the failures of the CIA and other intelligence services especially around 9/11. It was always easy to put the blame on someone or a group of people. After each major failure new organizations have been built up to avoid similar failures.But nobody has looked at the systematic failures of organizations like the CIA. Milo Jones and Philippe Silberzahn have taken a much broader analysis to the known failures. They have uncovered important lessons not only worthwhile for the intelligence community but for anyone working or running larger organizations.Besides all these lessons the book is simply fascinating to read. See it here on Amazon.
Lien : Constructing Cassandra is an outstanding and stimulating read. Jones and Silberzahn provide new and thought provoking insights into the world of intelligence analysis. See it here on Amazon.